about 100 miles away, and left food supplies for a few weeks. But crops on the Bikinians’ new home produced signif
icantly less food than those on Bikini, and the nearby waters had far less edible catch.
Within two years, the population was on the verge of starvation.
In 1948, the US responded to their plight. Once more the Bikinians were uprooted — this ti
me to Kwajalein, where they lived in tents next to a cement airstrip used by Americans. Six months lat
er, they were shipped to Kili Island, 400 miles south of Bikini, where they again began to starve.
One attempt was made to resettle the Bikinians in the late 1960s when some 150 residents we
re returned to their atoll. But in 1978 it was revealed that within one year some residents had seen a 75% inc
rease in radioactive material in their bodies, and all residents were once again moved, this time to Majuro Atoll.
In the early 1980s, the Bikinians filed a class action lawsuit against the US, which eventually resu
lted in the creation of a $90 million trust fund for their local government for cleanup and resettlement purposes.
Still, presidential vetoes occur more often than you might think. Every president since Garfield has vetoed at least
one bill. The younger Bush was the first president since John Quincy Adams to go a full four years without a veto, acco
rding to the Congressional Research Service. The House, which was Republican-led for Bush’s entire first term,
was protecting him from bills he opposed. Barack Obama, similarly, had help on Capitol Hill for most of his pr
esidency, just as Trump has. But Obama did veto two bills even when Democrats controlled both chambers of Congress.
The President with the most vetoes was Democrat Roosevelt, wi
th 635, although he also served the longest in the White House (12 years). All those vetoes cam
e even though Roosevelt enjoyed Democratic majorities for his entire time in the White House.
If you plot vetoes alongside how closely aligned Congress is
to the president, it used to be quite common for a president to veto bills from a House and Senate ali
gned with him. This data comes from The American Presidency Project at the University of California at Santa Barbara.
structural optimization from the previous month, which is reflected by the pickup in medium
and long-term lending and the continuous increase in bond financing. Looking ahead, such structural improvement is likely to co
ntinue, further boosting the supportive role of “loose credit supply” in “stabilizing growth.”
From the external perspective, the following three factors are expected to support the Chinese
yuan’s exchange rate to regain long-term stability, thus enhancing the autonomy of China’s monetary policy.
First, developed economies have slowed their pace of tightening. Since the end of 2018, due to the stalling global recovery and
signs of a returning crisis, central banks of various developed economies have become more cautious toward the no
rmalization of monetary policy. The European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and the Reserve Bank of Australia successively lowered their fo
recast for economic growth. In the US, the dovish voice inside the Fed has gradually increased. Because of this, si
nce late January, the yield inversion of short-term government bonds in China and the US has been eased. Thus, despite the
monetary policy differentiation between China and other major developed economies, the degree of d
ivergence is expected to decline, weakening the long-term pressure on the yuan’s exchange rate.